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Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification:
Admissibility and Alternatives
I. INTRODUCTION
On a dreary Thursday night in a suburban area, a young African-
American male walks into a convenience store. He is wearing a black t-
shirt and baggy blue jeans. He appears to be of average height and
weight. A ski mask obscuring his face shows only his mouth, nose, and
eyes. Behind the counter is a middle-aged white woman. The young
man walks directly to the counter, brandishes a gun and yells, "Hand
over the money, or I'll kill you!" The terrified clerk hands over the con-
tents of the register in an exchange lasting less than a minute. The
young man runs out the front door, pulling off his mask. A white cus-
tomer about to enter the store bumps into him in the dimly-lit entry way.
The customer glances at the young man for a second or two, says,
"Excuse me," and enters the store. The young man heads to his car and
starts to pull out of the lot, passing under a street light as he waits to
enter traffic. At that point, a police cruiser enters the lot. Before pulling
in the vigilant African-American policeman stares at the young man for
a second or two. All three witnesses to the robbery provide descriptions
to the investigating policeman who arrives in response to the robbery. A
week later, all three are shown a photo lineup containing the suspect's
photo. The policeman identifies him immediately. The customer says
he is pretty sure of his identity. The clerk fails to identify him. The
suspect is arrested and a live lineup is shown two days later. The police-
man reiterates his identification and the customer now is sure of his
identification. The clerk is not available to be interviewed until one
month later, and, after having been told that a suspect is in custody, now
identifies the suspect.
All three witnesses identify the suspect at trial. In response, the
defense offers an alibi defense and asserts misidentification. The
defense attorney, a public defender, is an extremely effective advocate,
and cross-examines the witnesses regarding their identifications and
credibility. She then attempts to introduce a preeminent expert on the
psychological factors affecting eyewitness identifications. This expert is
a staff psychologist at the Public Defender's office who will testify that
stress can have a significant affect on memory; that cross-racial identifi-
cations can be less reliable; that short term encounters can result in mis-
identification; that a delay of more than a week or so between an
encounter and identification lessens its accuracy; and that confidence in
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identification has little correlation to its accuracy. The prosecution will
attempt to exclude this expert's testimony. Considering that the state
has no other evidence linking the suspect to the crime, how will the trial
judge rule on this matter?
This issue has received a great amount of attention. In most states,
as well as in the vast majority of federal circuits, this testimony will
probably not be admitted into evidence. Although it is not generally
excluded, per se expert testimony on eyewitness identifications does not
enjoy a favored status in the state or federal courts. The Florida
Supreme Court has identified three basic approaches used by courts
when ruling on this matter.'
First, the court identified a discretionary view allowing the trial
judge to exercise great discretion in admitting expert testimony regard-
ing eyewitness identification.2 This view is ostensibly taken by the
overwhelming majority of the states as well as by various federal cir-
cuits.3 The second view is prohibitory, providing a per se rule of exclu-
sion of the use of expert testimony regarding "the credibility of
eyewitness identification testimony under any circumstances."4 Only a
few states (Oregon, Nebraska, Kansas, Louisiana and Tennessee) and a
federal circuit (Eleventh Circuit) have adopted this prohibitory view.5
Finally, a very few jurisdictions (Third Federal Circuit, Massachusetts
and California) have adopted a "limited admissibility" rule finding it an
abuse of the trial judge's discretion to exclude this expert testimony
where there is no substantial corroborating evidence tying the defendant
to the crime.6
This Comment will argue that, while ostensibly following the
"majority" rule, actual policy of courts so disfavors this type of evidence
that many courts are actually operating in a nearly per se exclusionary
manner. The courts in many jurisdictions have never overruled the trial
judge's discretionary exclusion of misidentification testimony, thereby
sending a message that almost inherently disqualifies this testimony.
Following an overview of the theory and methodology followed by the
courts, this Comment will turn to a discussion of the three groups,
attempting to show a pattern of disqualification in many states regardless
of the factual underpinnings of the particular cases. Of course, this
approach inherently fails because there is little documentation of such
testimony when admitted by the trial courts. These cases would have no
I. McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1998).
2. Id. at 370.
3. Id.
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occasion to ever reach review by the appellate courts. Nonetheless, the
number of exclusions of testimony in what would arguably be proper
cases for this testimony are legion. This Comment will attempt to show
the narrow set of circumstances where courts will allow this testimony
and find the common thread of reason that justifies this seemingly harsh
treatment.
In addition, this Comment will attempt to analyze the solutions
offered by courts to ameliorate the inherent problems in eyewitness
identifications without resorting to the use of expert testimony. Fore-
most among these alternatives is the use of cautionary jury instructions
as a substitute for the expert testimony. Other courts have developed
specific tests to be applied, generally under the rubric of discretion to
identify those circumstances sufficiently serious to invoke the admission
of expert testimony. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has even
suggested that judges sua sponte inform the jury of the various factors
that could affect the reliability of identifications.7 Apparently, this
would be a combination of judicial notice and jury instruction placing
the judge in the role of quasi-expert. Most courts still rely on the tradi-
tional solution, that effective cross-examination and argument by the
attorneys, along with the generalized knowledge possessed by a jury, are
sufficient to alleviate any misidentification that may occur.8
This Comment will attempt to make sense of these various solu-
tions and determine which, if any, sufficiently safeguard the rights of the
accused against erroneous eyewitness identification, while not creating
an impenetrable shield against eyewitness testimony. With the
prosecutorial burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the aura
of infallibility surrounding expert testimony makes it difficult for the
prosecution to overcome that burden. This may well be an implicit
piece of the puzzle in determining why the courts are generally so loathe
to allow this testimony.
However, the alternatives offered by the courts indicate that they
are not willing to merely throw defendants to the wolves without at least
some alternatives to expert testimony. Courts will usually offer a jury
instruction, or at least allow broad latitude in cross-examination and
argument regarding this testimony. The rationale seems to be that
allowing expert testimony on eyewitness identification swings the pen-
dulum too far towards the defendant unless the court makes an implicit
decision that there is at least a strong possibility that the defendant may
be innocent. In the majority of cases, the admission of this testimony
7. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999).
8. See generally BRIAN CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOL. & THE LAW (1995).
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could make the burden on the prosecution untenable and lead to a rash
of unjust acquittals. This would be a singularly unfortunate result in
light of the plethora of reasonable alternatives available.
II. SUBJECT MATTER OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Basis of Testimony
It is undeniable that "[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mis-
taken identification." 9 In Jackson v. Fogg, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that "[c]enturies of experience in the administration of
criminal justice have shown that convictions based solely on testimony
that identifies a defendant previously unknown to the witness is highly
suspect. Of all the various kinds of evidence it is the least reliable
.... ,, In order to combat this acknowledged unreliability, defendants
often seek to offer expert testimony concerning the credibility of eyewit-
nesses. Proponents of this testimony argue that "the average juror actu-
ally knows little about factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness
identifications.""II There is an empirical basis for this statement.' 2 For
example, two scholars conducted a survey of lay knowledge in Seattle
and Omaha, two quintessentially typical American cities. The study
asked a sampling of laypeople to respond to hypothetical situations that
implicated the following factors: cross-racial recognition; prior photoar-
ray; retention interval; training; and age. For instance, the respondent
might be given a hypothetical involving a two month interval between a
criminal incident and the identification of a suspect. In a correct answer
to this hypothetical, the respondent would recognize the negative corre-
lation in reliability of the identification, in accord with scientific studies.
Therefore, a low percentage of correct answers would indicate, that the
general public would have little knowledge regarding the particular sci-
entific principle at hand. The survey results indicated that the public had
little knowledge of the variables cited."'
Therefore, given the low level of knowledge the general public has
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification proponents would
argue that under Federal Rule of Evidence 702,14 expert testimony
would help the trier of fact to understand an area outside the scope of his
9. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
10. 589 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
I1. Cindy J. O'Hagan, When Seeing Is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Identification
Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 760-61 (1993).
12. See ELIZABETH LoFrus, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 8-19 (1979).
13. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 8, at 175.
14. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
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or her general knowledge.' 5
Rule 702 requires that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."' 16 Ironically,
courts frequently utilized the Rule 702 standard to exclude expert testi-
mony, on the theory that this is an area within the common knowledge
of the jurors and therefore the testimony is useless. In United States v.
Christophe, the court held that such testimony "addresses an issue of
which the jury already generally is aware, and it will not contribute to
their understanding of the particular dispute."' 7 However, the threshold
question is whether this assertion is valid in light of the latest research
done in this field. A number of common juror misperceptions have been
identified undermining the assertion that this expert testimony is of little
value. Surely, the pertinent inquiry is not whether factors leading to
misidentifications exist. The pertinent inquiry is whether expert testi-
mony regarding these factors is of any use to jurors. If jurors already
have a generalized sense of these factors, then "[v]igorous cross-exami-
nation, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence."' 8 Yet, if Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, a leading
expert on misperceptions regarding eyewitness testimony, and her sup-
porters are correct, then this information is far enough outside the com-
mon knowledge of the layperson to meet any rules "helpfulness"
requirements.
B. Juror Misperceptions
Dr. Loftus has identified a number of these misapprehensions.
First, many jurors believe that "witnesses remember the details of vio-
lent crimes better than those of nonviolent ones."' 19 Research tends to
show, however, that added stress caused by violence clouds memory.2 °
The presence of a weapon can exacerbate this. A weapon diverts a wit-
ness's attention away from the assailant's face; a phenomena known as
weapon focus. 2' The effects of stressful environmental factors during
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise .... " FED. R. Evin. 702.
15. For the most part, state rules of evidence are analogous to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Any significant deviations will be noted in the text.
16. FED. R. EVID. 702.
17. See United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hudson,
884 F.2d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 1989).
18. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1983).
19. See ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 1-6, at 6 (3d ed. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
20. Id. § 2.9.
21. See Douglas J. Narby, Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, The Effects of Witness,
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the viewing period are illustrated by the Yerkes-Dodson law.22 This law
states that, while moderate stress might have a positive effect on the
accuracy of an identification, a greater amount of stress would likely
have an inverse relationship to accuracy, by greatly increasing the possi-
bility of misidentification. 3 Due to misconceptions regarding the
effects of stress, this is one of the most common areas of proposed testi-
mony for eyewitness identification experts.
Second, a majority of jurors believe that "[t]he more confident a
witness seems, the more accurate the testimony is likely to be."24
According to Dr. Loftus, research shows little correlation between confi-
dence and reliability." It should be noted, however, that studies indicate
some correlation between the two variables, albeit not very strong.26
Moreover, other researchers have identified flaws in Loftus's methodol-
ogy that artificially attenuates the link.2 ' Thus, it is speculative whether
the scientific evidence is strong enough on this issue to render it a fit
subject for expert testimony.
Perhaps the most significant misconception is that jurors tend to
underestimate the difficulties of cross-racial identifications. In one
study, jurors were given the following question: "Some people say that
it is more difficult for people of one race to identify people of a different
race. Do you think this is: (a) true; (b) false; or (c) more true for
whites viewing nonwhites than for nonwhites viewing whites?"
28
Thirty-three percent chose (a), forty-five percent chose (b), twenty
percent chose (c), and the remainder responded "[I] don't know.
29
According to Loftus, (a) is the correct answer.3" While many studies
have recognized this phenomena, the "theoretical underpinnings are elu-
sive."'" Nonetheless, there is little doubt that "own-race bias in recogni-
tion is reliable and appreciable in magnitude ....
These are just a few of the factors frequently misapprehended by
jurors. There is also a body of additional information regarded by many
experts to fall outside the common knowledge of jurors, hence bringing
Target, and Situational Factors on Eyewitness Identifications, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 37 (Siegfried L. Sporer et al. eds., 1996).
22. LoFrus, supra note 12.
23. Id.
24. See LOFTUS & DOYLE, supra note 19, at §§ 1-6.
25. Id.
26. See Narby, Cutler & Penrod, supra note 21, at 33.
27. Id. at 34.
28. LovrUs & DOYLE, supra note 19, at 7.
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id.
31. Narby, Cutler & Penrod, supra note 21, at 42.
32. Id. at 30.
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testimony regarding this information under the domain of Rule 702." 3
Dr. Loftus noted that at the acquisition stage the following factors are
not within the common knowledge of the lay person: (1) event factors
including lighting conditions, duration, and violence; and (2) witness
factors including stress, fear, age, sex, and expectations. At the retention
stage Dr. Loftus suggests people may overlook the time elasped or post
event information. Furthermore, Dr. Loftus notes that at the retrieval
stage a lay person may overlook the method of questioning or the confi-
dence level.34
While this is far from an all-inclusive list, these are among the most
commonly proffered subjects of testimony by Dr. Loftus and her
colleagues.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Scientific Inquiry under Daubert/Kumho and the Federal Rules
One question bound to be asked by all courts, particularly in light
of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals5 and its progeny, is
whether eyewitness research qualifies to be considered based on the sci-
entific method. Daubert proposed an inquiry based on scientific knowl-
edge. This inquiry focused on: 1) whether the technique can and has
been tested; 2) peer review and publication; 3) the known and potential
rate of error; and 4) general acceptance by the scientific community.
While the voluminous publications on the subject of misidentification by
witnesses satisfy the second criterion, the remaining three are frequently
considered as satisfied by the amount of research conducted in this field.
Moreover, in light of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,37 the Daubert
inquiry is not considered a strict and exclusive list of factors. Kumho
attempts to clarify the Daubert test of reliability by deeming it "flexi-
ble."38 Moreover, Kumho stated that the Daubert factors "neither neces-
sarily nor exclusively apply to all experts or in every case."3 9 The
Kumho opinion suggests that a search for assurances of correctness is
inherent in the discretionary process. In many cases, this threshold
33. See generally LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 19; MELVIN B. LEWIS ET AL., EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY, STRATEGY AND TACTICS (1984); Gary L. Wells, How Adequate is Human Intuition
for Judging Eyewitness Testimony?, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
277 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Loftus eds., 1984).
34. Loirus & DOYLE, supra note 19, at § 202.
35. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
36. Id. at 593-94.
37. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
38. Id. at 140.
39. As will be demonstrated later, this flexibility is at the heart of the discretion exercised by
trial judges in the eyewitness expert context. Id. at 141.
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determination can provide a sufficient rationale for the trial judge to
exclude expert testimony, notwithstanding other considerations. Of
course, Daubert and Kumho are not limited to scientific approval
because the "helpfulness" or "fit" requirement of Rule 702 must still be
met.
In response to Kumho, Rule 702 was modified. The new rule reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.4°
This amendment codifies the Kumho flexibility test. The Advisory
Committee notes state that the trial judge "must have considerable lee-
way in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining
whether particular expert testimony is reliable."'" It is also critical to a
complete understanding of the amended rule to recognize that the
amended rule has not vitiated the fit or helpfulness inquiry of the old
rule. The Advisory Committee's notes state that:
"[t]here is no more certain test for determining when experts may be
used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman
would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible
degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a
specialized understanding of the subject involved ....""
While its framers possibly intended the rule to reflect the liberal
bent towards admissibility of expert testimony, the flexible framework
of the inquiry suggested it will allow judges to exclude expert eyewit-
ness testimony with impunity, providing a rules-oriented basis for the
exclusion. In light of the problems with this testimony discussed infra,
this is not necessarily a bad thing.
B. Methodologies Utilized
Researchers have utilized a wide variety of methodologies in reach-
ing generally accepted scientific conclusions. Many researchers have
utilized questionnaires4 3 to study groups to determine whether certain
factors are indeed within the common knowledge of jurors, as seen in
40. FED. R. EvID. 702.
41. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (citing Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152).
42. Id. (citing Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952).
43. See O'Hagan, supra note 11. A sample question: "Suppose that a man and a woman both
witness two crimes. One crime involves violence while the other is non-violent. Which statement
1066 [Vol. 55:1059
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the cross-racial identification question posed supra." The best-known
study performed in this manner was conducted in the early 1980's. The
Knowledge of Eyewitness Behavior Questionnaire was designed to
assess whether people, more specifically jurors, were cognizant of the
factors that influence eyewitness identification."a The results showed
that people were generally misinformed as to the factors that influenced
eyewitness identifications. 46 Similar results were seen in other coun-
tries, and a follow-up test given in the District of Columbia to actual
empaneled jurors also revealed similar results.47 Critics have argued
that these questionnaires may not be accurate in determining how actual
testimony is viewed. 48 Nevertheless, this type of testing has generally
proven sufficient to qualify as "science."
A second methodology utilizes prediction studies. In these tests,
subjects are presented with a fictional line-up along with the instructions
given to the fictional identifier by the administrators. The subjects are
then asked to "predict" the outcome.49 The results should theoretically
reflect the knowledge of the subjects vis-a-vis the scientific principles
regarding eyewitness identifications. Even proponents of this research
method are cognizant of its inherent deficiencies. Leading researchers
acknowledge that this is a very difficult type of test to compose and
could almost always be improved.5" This method could be criticized as
being overly dependent on the actual given test, since responses might
reflect the biases of the tester rather than the desired correlations. More-
over, these tests are not reflective of the actual outcomes of non-imagi-
nary identifications. Thus, predictive studies may well be inherently
suspect and of little probative value.
Third, and even more intriguingly, researchers utilize mock jury
studies designed to test juror knowledge of factors believed to affect the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications. 51 For example, in one study, real
lawyers cross-examined "witnesses" in a reenactment of an actual trial.
A number of factors were tested, and interestingly, most of the mock
do you believe is true?" The responses asked for the students to determine which crime would be
remembered better by which sex. Id. at 60-61.
44. Kenneth A. Deffenbacher & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common
Understanding Concerning Human Behavior?, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982).
45. Lovrus & DOYLE supra note 19, § 1-6.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally Wells, supra note 33.
49. See generally John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors
to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319 (1983).
50. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 8, at 64. The section of this book from pp. 55-71 provides
an excellent, if highly technical, discussion of research methodology.
51. See generally Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Trivial Persuasion in the Courtroom:
The Power of (a few) Minor Details, 56 J. PERSON. & SOC. PsYcHoL. 669 (1989).
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jurors erroneously relied on the confidence of the witnesses to reach
credibility decisions.5" Other tests have shown the significance of a sin-
gle eyewitness, even one partially blind, to a mock jury in reaching a
guilty verdict.53 These studies appear to achieve interesting results that
can be presented to a jury in the form of expert testimony regarding
scientific findings regarding common lay misconceptions.
Finally, a new and intriguing methodology is the "retrospective-
DNA method" being utilized by Dr. Gary Wells. 4 In thirty-six out of
forty cases studies by Wells in which the use of DNA cleared convicted
felon a misidentification was involved in the original conviction.55 In
light of the growing acceptance of DNA evidence as outcome-determi-
native, findings based on this methodology will probably be considered
inherently credible. While this does not appear to be a methodology
discussed by the courts, DNA testing seems to possess sufficient indicia
of reliability to withstand any Daubert inquiry.
Therefore, it is undeniable that a body of valid research exists. This
research is sufficiently credible and enjoys sufficient scientific respecta-
bility so as to pass the first part of the Daubert inquiry. Thus, the ques-
tion for the courts under Rule 702 is whether allowing this information
to be presented to jurors is helpful, necessary or even deleterious to the
search for justice.
IV. DECISIONS IN THE STATE COURTS
As stated above, courts have adhered to three basic rules. The fol-
lowing sections will set out in some detail both the factual scenarios and
the rationales that courts have employed in adhering to these
approaches. This Comment will discuss these in turn, from outright
"NO" (per se inadmissibility) to "MAYBE" (the discretionary rule) to
"YES (under certain circumstances)" (the limited admissibility rule).
A. NO!-The Per Se Exclusionary Rule
Only an extremely limited number of federal or state courts have
explicitly prohibited expert testimony regarding the credibility of eye-
witness testimony.56 Oregon has been a strong critic of this testimony.
In State v. Calia, the court considered a case where the main evidence
52. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 19, § 1-3.
53. Id.
54. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 56 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
603 (1998).
55. Id. at 612-14.
56. Among federal courts, the Eleventh Circuit has been a vehement proponent of the
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Holloway, 971 F.2d 675 (1 lth Cir. 1992).
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against the defendant charged with robbery was the victim's identifica-
tion.57 The only corroborative evidence was testimony that the defen-
dant was in Portland, the scene of the crime, at the time in question. The
victim did not view a photo lineup until nearly eight months after the
robbery, where he picked out the defendant. Nearly two and a half years
later, he identified the defendant once again. The defense sought to
introduce what the court pejoratively termed a "post-Proustian theory of
deja vu" wherein the victim might have been conditioned to identify the
defendant by having viewed his photo, and not necessarily due to the
defendant's being the perpetrator of the robbery.58 The court stated that
the witness would be unable to conclude whether the recognition was
accurate, merely point out the built-in possibility of error.59 The court
explicitly stated that "[tihe law does not deal with that potential for error
by allowing expert witnesses to debate the quality of the evidence for the
jury."" Rather the court was content to rely on the rules of evidence,
the arguments of the lawyers, jury instructions, and the jury system itself
to find errors in identification.6 The particular instruction given in this
case provided:
In this case, there has been eyewitness identification of the defen-
dant. When you consider the weight to be given.., you should consider
the [familiarity] of the witness with the defendant, the opportunity ... to
make an identification, taking into consideration such matters as time,
height, movement, the number of persons present and the excitement
attending the event or occasion, the susceptibility of the witness through
suggestion of others or other groups, and the period of time that elapsed
between the initial observation and the final identification.62 These fac-
tors, according to the court, stated the law and provided all the assistance
the jury would need. There is no need for expert testimony on identifi-
cations in Oregon.
6 3
Other states have also followed Oregon's explicit lead. In State v.
Ammons, the Supreme Court of Nebraska specifically held expert testi-
mony on eyewitnesses inadmissible despite reviewing a case hinging
upon a lone identification without corroborative evidence.64 Citing the
Nebraska Rules of Evidence, the court held that such testing assisted
57. 514 P.2d 1354 (Or. Ct. App. 1973).





63. See also State v. Goldsby, 650 P.2d 952 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
64. 305 N.W.2d 812 (Neb. 1981).
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neither jury nor judge in understanding the evidence or a fact in issue.65
The accuracy or lack thereof of the identifications was within "the com-
mon experience of daily life."6 6 Therefore, the court felt the testimony
invaded the province of the jury.67 State v. Sardeson reiterated the
Ammons rule in the strongest possible terms.68 Sardeson was charged
with burglary. The main witness against him had been shown a photo of
the defendant several times and identified him in court. The defense
expert was prepared to testify regarding the results of experiments where
a subject was shown the same photo twice. The court reaffirmed that an
expert is not permitted to suggest to a jury how a witness's testimony
should be evaluated. "[F]ar from being an abuse of discretion, [the rul-
ing was] the only correct ruling possible .... ",69 The exclusionary rule
could not be more clearly stated.
The Louisiana courts have recently reasserted their aversion to this
testimony. In State v. Laymon, the court reviewed a case in which testi-
mony of an expert psychologist was excluded from the trial of an
accused murderer.7" The eyewitness, a mentally challenged young man,
was allegedly traumatized by the event, and the expert was to testify
regarding the effect of the trauma on the reliability of the identifica-
tion.7" The court asserted that the test of admissibility holds that opinion
evidence cannot usurp the function of the jury or touch the issue before
the jury.72 In Laymon, the court held that the testimony was rightly
excluded because it had prejudicial effect beyond its probative value and
would have usurped the function of the jury.73 Although not explicitly
stating an exclusionary rule, this case is analogous to the Massachusetts
rule discussed infra that has implicitly embraced the inclusionary rule.7 4
While there is ostensible discretion, there are virtually no circumstances
where the testimony would be admissible in Louisiana.75
A similar state of affairs exists in Tennessee, where State v.
Wooden7 6 is still good law. In Wooden, the defendant, accused of bur-
glary, rape and sundry other charges, attempted to admit the expert testi-
65. Id. at 814. (citing NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-702 (1979)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 437 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 1989).
69. Id. at 485.
70. 756 So. 2d 1160 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
71. Id. at 1175.
72. Id. at 1176 (citing United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976)).
73. Id. at 1177.
74. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (Mass. 1983).
75. See also State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939 (La. 1982) (holding expert testimony on
eyewitnesses inadmissible).
76. 658 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
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mony of Dr. Robert Buckhout.77 Buckhout was to testify only generally
regarding various factors affecting identification and memory. 78 The
court stated simply, "[w]hether an eyewitness's testimony is reliable is a
matter which the jury can determine from hearing the witness's testi-
mony on direct and cross-examination and which does not require expert
testimony."79 Moreover, the court would not even issue the so-called
Telfaire instruction requested by the defense. 80 The court was content
with the standard Tennessee instruction, which did not address witness
credibility at all.
In State v. Ward, the court went further by stating that expert testi-
mony on eyewitnesses had "not attained that degree of exactitude which
would qualify it as a specific science," and that any marginal helpfulness
it might possess did not render it admissible.8 The courts in Tennessee
have denied a per se inadmissibility standard, but have nonetheless con-
tinued to support exclusion even in somewhat questionable circum-
stances.82 Most recently, the court considered the issue in Beamon v.
State.83 In this burglary case, there was evidence connecting the defen-
dant through his sister to the burglary in question, as well as an in-court
identification by the victim, who could not identify the defendant prior
to trial. While acknowledging the discretionary rule, the court was satis-
fied that the defense attorney had ample opportunity to "exploit what
appeared to be problems in the State's eyewitness proof."84 The testi-
mony was before the jurors, and that was held sufficient. Again, without
an overt statement, the court had reiterated a "virtual" per se rule against
admission.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Kansas explicitly stated an adherence
to the per se exclusionary standard in State v. Gaines.85 In Kansas, not
with standing the circumstances, expert testimony is always prohibited.
As far back as 1981, the Kansas Supreme Court held in State v. Warren
that the answer to misidentifications was not admitting expert testimony,
77. Along with Dr. Loftus, Dr. Buckhout is a recurring figure throughout these cases.
78. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d at 556.
79. Id. at 557.
80. This instruction, commonly requested in conjunction with, or in lieu of, expert testimony
is derived from that in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972), containing many
of the same factors that have been highlighted by experts in the field.
81. 712 S.W.2d 485, 486-87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
82. See State v. Coley, C.C.A. No. OICOI-9707-CC-00270, 1998 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS
1082 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1998) (excluding testimony despite presence of cross-racial
identification, evidence pointing to another suspect, presence of an alibi defense and no physical
evidence implicating the defendant).
83. No. E1999-0614-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 696 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Sept. 8, 2000).
84. Id. at *12.
85. 926 P.2d 641 (Kan. 1996).
1071
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
but a proper cautionary "instruction, coupled with vigorous cross-exami-
nation and persuasive argument by the defense counsel . "..."86 In State
v. Wheaton, the court was asked to overrule Warren based on new
research in the field, but the court declined and adhered to the same
basic tenets as in its previous cases.87 The Gaines court analyzed the
cases arguing for limited admissibility and a discretionary rule, then
promptly and summarily dismissed them. Holding that "expert testi-
mony regarding eyewitness identification should not be admitted into
trial."88
These are the courts that have most explicitly adopted an exclusion-
ary rule. There are others, however, that maintain an allegiance to the
majority rule while operating in effect as barriers to the admission of
expert testimony on this subject. Arguably, Tennessee and Louisiana
are in that class. However, they appear to be operating more openly,
without the veneer of discretion that other courts foist to cover their true
agendas.
B. "MAYBE"-The Majority "Discretionary" Rule
There is no clean definition of the majority rule. In fact, it is less a
rule than a compendium of cases that run the gamut from bordering on
per se exclusion to the fringes of limited admissibility. The simplest
way to try to understand this rule is to examine representative cases in
various jurisdictions and try to make sense out of the underlying policy
for their decisions and any common factual situations that seem to arise.
In this way, it is possible to find broad similarities between various juris-
dictions and to establish some patterns therein.
Many of the "discretionary" cases revolve around rationales
derived (at least implicitly) from Rule 702. Rule 702 states in pertinent
part, "[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."89 While testimony relating to an ultimate issue of fact may
not be objectionable under Rule 704,90 Rule 702 requires the proffered
testimony to be helpful to the trier of fact. This has provided a fertile
ground for the courts to exercise discretion in excluding expert
86. 635 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Kan. 1981).
87. 729 P.2d 1183, 1189-90 (Kan. 1986).
88. Gaines, 926 P.2d at 649.
89. FED. R. EvID. 702.
90. "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R.
EvID. 704(a).
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testimony. 9'
Pennsylvania is a state straddling the fence between per se exclu-
sion and discretion. In Commonwealth v. Simmons, the court encoun-
tered a situation involving inconsistent testimony from various
eyewitnesses. 92 The defense sought to point out general patterns regard-
ing identifications to educate the jury about possible influencing factors
so that they might more effectively evaluate the testimony of the wit-
nesses.93 The court held that expert testimony could not intrude upon
the province of the jury, reiterating earlier Pennsylvania law.94 The
court in Simmons relied on the old standby that the testimony could
invade the province of the jury, and further, that the expert testimony
could give an unwarranted appearance of authority on matters the jury
could assess on its own anyway.95 These rationales are undoubtedly
consistent with Rule 702.
This decision was also consistent with an interesting appellate level
case, Commonwealth v. Gregory.96 In Gregory, the defendant was
charged with attacks on several young women. Besides numerous eye-
witnesses, there was physical evidence linking the defendant to the
crimes and a very similar modus operandi for each of the attacks. The
defense presented Dr. Robert Buckhout to testify regarding various fac-
tors affecting eyewitness identification including the effects of stress,
cross-racial identification, the lack of correlation between confidence
and accuracy, and weapons focus. 97 The Court excluded his testimony
based on an impermissible infringement into the province of the jury in
an area they could determine with common sense.98 The court slyly
noted that Buckhout's testimony was rejected in previous cases, includ-
ing the remand of United States v. Downing. 9 Most significantly, the
court stated that the defense received "the greatest boon of all," a cau-
91. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals provides an excellent discussion of the application of
the rules in United States v. Downing, discussed in depth later. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
92. 662 A.2d 621 (Pa. 1995).
93. Id. at 631.
94. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1986) (holding that testimony
regarding the effects of stress on identification were not admissible); Commonwealth v.
Gallagher, 547 A. 2d 355 (Pa. 1988) (holding that testimony on timely identification and the
correlation with misidentification could not be admitted).
95. Simmons, 662 A.2d at 631.
96. Nos. 2856-2862 1990 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 15 (Comm Pleas Court of Philadelphia
County Feb. 16, 1990).
97. Id. at *30-31.
98. Id. at *32-33.
99. 609 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Penn. 1985), affd, 780 F. 2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985). Downing is
one of the leading cases in the limited admissibility variety, yet on remand, the lower court failed
to heed the hints offered by the Third Circuit and rejected Buckhout's proffered testimony.
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tionary instruction regarding the efficacy of eyewitness testimony.'°°
While not stating that the rule is per se exclusion, Pennsylvania clearly
masquerades as a discretionary state.
Conversely, Wisconsin seems to be one of the few states that truly
follows an actual discretionary rule. While Wisconsin courts have
admitted testimony, even in cases like Small, where there was adequate
corroborative evidence, they have excluded it on occasion, and even lim-
ited it to specific topics. In State v. Kutska, the court provided an excel-
lent example, utilizing discretion to limit expert testimony to relevant
issues without resorting to any hard and fast rules that would bind future
decisions. '0o
The defendant in Kutska was accused of murder. Witnesses saw
the defendant with an accomplice walking away from the murder scene
carrying a large object. Shortly thereafter, the defendant told one of the
witnesses that the victim was "missing."'0 2 The defense offered an
expert to testify to the standard difficulties in eyewitness identification
(testimony sometimes admitted in Wisconsin) including the topic of
"repressed-memory," owing to the fact that one of the witnesses had not
remembered the events until six months later."°3 The court was con-
cerned that the expert would be seen as a "super-juror" endowed with an
aura of "mythic infallibility."'0 4 Second, it seemed that the testimony
could overwhelm and confuse the jury in areas where jurors had some
experience and common sense. The trial court invoked Wisconsin Rule
of Evidence 907.02 allowing expert testimony in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or determine a fact in issue."'' 5 In limiting the expert's testimony, the
court decided that this would impermissibly invade the province of the
jury; a dubious utilization of the rule at best. A more coherent explana-
tion was offered through the use of Wisconsin Rule of Evidence 904.03,
the standard probative value versus prejudicial effect boilerplate.'0 6 In
light of the concerns regarding undue influence by the expert, this seems
a legitimate approach whereas the repressed memory testimony would
seem to assist the trier of fact.
An example of outright reversal of an exclusion is State v. Tucker,
100. Gregory, 1990 Phila. Cty Rptr. LEXIS 15 at *34.
101. No. 97-2962-CR, 1998 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1089 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1998)
102. Id. at *6.
103. Id. at *65.
104. Id. at *69.
105. WiS. STAT. § 907.02 (2000).
106. Kutska, 1998 Wis. Ct. App. LEXIS 1089 at *71.
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although the court deemed the error to be harmless. °7 The defendant,
charged with armed assault and rape, was identified by three victims and
a witness. There was also physical evidence in the nature of a DNA
match. After declining to hear testimony from the expert, and despite
expert affidavits tending to undermine the identifications of at least two
of the witnesses, the trial court categorically barred the testimony. The
appellate court held this to be abuse of discretion because the lower
court provided no factual basis for its decision and declined to hear from
the expert. °8 Again, discretion was the standard actually adhered to.
The Wisconsin courts have also placed great emphasis on modify-
ing instructions to accomplish the ends of informing the jurors fully. In
State v. Murray, the court excluded evidence from an expert psycholo-
gist even where questionable identifications were the main evidence
against the defendant.'0 9 However, the court gave a specially modified
jury instruction speaking not only to the vagaries of eyewitness identifi-
cation but specifically to the difficulties in the particular case. This
instruction emphasized the problems an eyewitness could have had in
the case and listed various factors the jury should consider in determin-
ing the reliability of the eyewitness testimony. 0
In State v. Blair, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals went so far as to
tell the jury they might consider proximity, lighting, the physical ability
of the witness, the length of observation, and other factors in deciding
the credibility of an eyewitness."' The appellate court upheld the exclu-
sion of expert testimony, despite the fact that "reasonable people might
disagree," because it was not an abuse of discretion." 2 It speaks well of
the remarkable history of integrity of the Wisconsin court that the author
of the opinion favored a liberal Downing approach to the problem
authoring a lengthy footnote in support of this proposition favoring a
searching inquiry into the Downing factors, particularly the relevance of
the testimony." 3 Wisconsin might well be the paradigm of a true dis-
cretionary state.
Thus far, we have considered a true discretionary state as well as
one that hides a trend toward exclusion behind a so-called discretionary
107. Nos. 94-1201-CR, 94-1202-CR, 94-1203-CR, 1995 Wisc. App. LEXIS 942 (Wis. Ct.
App. Aug. 1, 1995).
108. Id. at *10-12. This abuse of discretion error was ultimately deemed harmless.
109. No. 92-0282-CR, 1992 Wis. App. LEXIS 948 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1992). The
defendant's face was partially obscured, the event was traumatic, the suspect had a gun, and there
may have been general recognition from multiple opportunities to view the defendant's photo as
opposed to an actual identification as the suspect. Id. at *7-8.
110. Id. at *9 n.5.
111. 473 N.W. 2d 566, 572 n.8 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
112. Id. at 572.
113. Id. at 572 n.9.
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rule. There are also states that favor limited admissibility despite a pub-
licly stated adherence to the discretionary rule. Arizona is extremely
close to outright adherence to limited admissibility. The case of State v.
Chapple"4 has been one of the most influential rulings on the issue of
admissibility and is cited in most jurisdictions (though not always favor-
ably). Chapple certainly contains one of the most convoluted fact pat-
tems in the recent memory.
In short, about one year after a drug-related murder, the defendant
was picked out of a possibly suggestive photo lineup by two individuals
who were at least marginally involved in the drug scheme. The defen-
dant was convicted solely on the basis of their identifications (they also
identified him at trial) as there was no other evidence against the defen-
dant. His defense was that, even if the two were not lying, this was a
case of mistaken identity. In light of the numerous attempts to procure
an identification, the defense sought to introduce the testimony of Dr.
Loftus who was prepared to testify regarding the feedback phenom-
ena. 5 The court relied upon United States v. Amaral,"6 which sets out
particularized criteria to evaluate admissibility. These criteria are: (1)
qualified expert; (2) proper subject; (3) conformity to a generally
accepted theory; and (4) probative value versus prejudicial effect." 7 In
Chapple, the court held that the first and third categories were not in
issue, and analyzed the case under the two remaining factors." 8
The prejudicial effect is minimal, according to the court, in cases
where the testimony is generalized in nature. Rule 702119 recognizes
that an expert may give a dissertation or other scientific explanation
leaving the trier of fact to apply these principles to the facts.120 The
court was concerned that, without Dr. Loftus' testimony, the jurors
might reach intuitive yet misguided conclusions.' 2 1 Loftus would have
informed the jury of specific variables, such as the forgetting curve,
stress, unconscious transference, post-event information, and the lack of
relation between confidence and accuracy. 1 2 In this case, using the
"abuse of discretion" standard, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the
trial court erred.' 23 The court articulated several factors for this deci-
sion. First, the facts were close. Second, the testimony was limited to
114. 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983).
115. Id. at 1218.
116. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
117. Id. at 1153.
118. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1219.
119. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Arizona Rules of Evidence rules are identical.
120. FED. R. EvIo. 702 advisory committee's note.
121. Chapple, 660 P.2d at 1221.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1224.
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general testimony. Third, there was no significant prejudice to the state.
Fourth, Loftus was a qualified expert testifying to a generally accepted
theory. Moreover, the probative value outweighed any prejudice.
Finally, the key issue pertained to whether Loftus' testimony was a
proper subject for testimony. Even considering the misapprehensions
that the jury could attach to the testimony, it was likely that her testi-
mony would indeed be helpful. 24 Most significantly, the court explic-
itly declined to "open the gates to a flood of expert evidence on the
subject."' 25 The holding itself was limited to the facts specific to this
case, and therefore not likely to recur with any particular frequency.1
26
It would seem that given this specific set of facts and the lack of any
corroborative evidence, expert testimony regarding the highly suspect
nature of the identifications did not invade the province of the jury.
Chapple seems a curious result, however, given the special circum-
stances of the case, not an unjust one.
State v. Via 127 provides an instructive example of the proper appli-
cation of Chapple. In Via, the eyewitness failed to identify the defen-
dant from a photo lineup. The defendant, however, was identified in a
live lineup. While the live lineup contained overly suggestive proce-
dures, there was little possibility of error since the witness viewed the
defendant during the crime for thirty minutes from a distance of mere
feet. Dr. Loftus was permitted to testify about variables and empirical
studies concerning identification. 128 However, the court excluded her
testimony regarding a dubious scientific experiment conducted on her
way to the airport related to the particular facts of Via.'29 The court held
that while Chapple suggested that general testimony was admissible
under certain circumstances, it did not countenance specific commentary
on particularized identifications. 30 Indeed, the court correctly pointed
out that "witnesses are not permitted as experts on how jurors should
decide cases."'' Chapple provides precedent for the court to allow this
testimony under particular circumstances; however, the courts in Ari-
zona remain reticent to extend Chapple beyond a carefully circum-
scribed limit.
Yet, the Arizona court has declined to admit expert testimony in
124. Id. at 1222.
125. Id. at 1224.
126. Id.
127. 704 P.2d 238 (Ariz. 1985).
128. Id. at 253.
129. Id. In this experiment, fourteen out of fifteen random subjects shown a photo of the live
lineup and given a description of the defendant identified him as the suspect.
130. Id.
131. Id. (citing ARiz. R. EVID. 704 comment).
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several cases. In State v. McCutcheon, a number of witnesses, both vic-
tims of robberies and disinterested observers, identified the defendant
from photo lineups.' 32 Physical evidence also linked the defendant to
the robberies. The court distinguished Chapple as "an extremely com-
plex factual scenario," '' 3 substantively different than that in the instant
case. Moreover, Chapple distinctly forbade the opening of floodgates to
allow expert testimony on misidentifications. Unlike Chapple, this was
"the usual case" where there was prompt, positive, unambiguous identi-
fication.134 Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Nor did the court abuse its discretion by refusing to admit expert
testimony in State v. Roscoe. 135 In Roscoe, despite only one eyewitness
who could not positively identify the defendant or his vehicle, the court
held that there was sufficient corroborative physical evidence to place
the defendant at the scene of the crime. Moreover, there was sufficient
cross-examination done to attack the witness's credibility.' 36 Therefore,
the trial court "properly concluded that the jurors could understand the
eyewitness evidence based upon their own experience."'' 37  Arizona
operates in a principled fashion regarding the discretionary rule, but
there is an undeniable tilt towards limited admissibility.
A brief survey reveals other states with similar doctrines. Illinois
has tended to follow the Chapple rule over time. This is unsurprising in
view of People v. Jordan, which held that expert testimony is generally
allowed by a qualified individual where his knowledge is not common to
lay people and will aid the trier of fact in reaching a conclusion. 138 In
People v. Enis, Dr. Solomon Fulero 139 was offered to provide expert
testimony regarding generalized factors. 140 The trial court excluded his
testimony. In affirming, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that expert
testimony should be admitted in specific circumstances without delineat-
ing what those circumstances should be. But, they did articulate a basic
test that has been applied: (1) the testimony must be based on accepted
scientific or technical principles; (2) the expert's qualifications must be
beyond the knowledge of the lay person; and (3) the testimony should
aid the trier of fact.' 4' The standard of review was abuse of discretion,
132. 781 P.2d 31 (Ariz. 1989).
133. Id. at 34.
134. Id. at 35.
135. 910 P.2d 635 (Ariz. 1996).
136. Id. at 647.
137. Id.
138. 469 N.E.2d 569, 576 (111. 1984).
139. Another of the standard players in the expert field.
140. 564 N.E.2d 1155 (I11. 1990).
141. Id. at 1179-80.
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and a clear showing of abuse was required for reversal. 14 2
Usually, the Illinois courts will uphold the trial court's determina-
tion on the use of expert testimony, but again the tilt towards limited
admissibility can be gleaned. In People v. Tisdel, while the appellate
court did not find that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding
testimony by Dr. Loftus, it stated that there would have been no abuse of
discretion had the testimony had been admitted.' 43 In Tisdel, four wit-
nesses identified the defendant as the shooter in a murder case nearly
one year after the incident. The defense prepared Dr. Loftus to testify to
the standard factors in a general sense. While acknowledging that the
rule is discretionary, the Illinois Appellate Court went through a lengthy
analysis to state that "[e]ven where cross-examination of an eyewitness
and an instruction are sufficient, allowing expert testimony may still be
helpful to the trier of fact.""' In this case, where there was no evidence
beyond the dubious identifications, Loftus's testimony would have been
helpful because she could testify generally without directly assessing
credibility.' 45 Without opening the door to a battle of the experts, the
court was able to protect against conviction based upon misidentifica-
tion.' 4 6 Illinois appears to have struck an acceptable balance in favor of
the Chapple rule by limiting testimony to generalized scientific
information.
The courts of Washington have also produced a strong and useful
rule differing from Chapple but perhaps of greater utility. In State v.
Moon, the defendant was accused of armed robbery.' The only evi-
dence adduced at trial was from two victims, and their identifications
were tainted by discrepancies between their original descriptions and the
actual appearance of the suspect. The court acknowledged that abuse of
discretion could exist in a narrow range of cases. 48 These cases may be
discovered by a three-part test: (1) where the identity of the defendant is
a principal issue; (2) where an alibi defense is presented; and (3) where
there is little or no additional evidence. 4 9 In other words, the court
made an ad hoc determination that the possibility of innocence was
greater in a case passing this test than in the usual case. The court held
that this would be one of those occasions, and that the testimony would
142. Id. at 1165.
143. 739 N.E.2d 31, 43 (I11. App. Ct. 2000).
144. Id. at 42-43.
145. Id. at 36.
146. Id. at 37.
147. 726 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
148. Id. at 1266.
149. Id. This test is a compendium of the tests outlined in Chapple, McDonald, and Downing.
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educate the jurors regarding their common assumptions. 50 The court
went so far as to find a remand for consideration pointless, considering
the appellate court's detailed inquiry.' 5 1 Once again, as with Chapple,
the court is performing an ad hoc balancing test. If the defendant is
more than likely guilty, then the expert could provide reasonable doubt
that may not be justified and therefore a guilty defendant may be found
not guilty. However, if there is a better than even chance that the defen-
dant is innocent, then the testimony should be admitted. The Moon test
is an attempt by the court to provide some sort of standard for this bal-
ancing to ameliorate the possibility of widely disparate rulings on simi-
lar sets of facts. The court has effectively developed a test which
provides a minimum standard for admissibility. No limitation forbids
courts from admitting testimony not meeting this standard, but at least
lower courts have a minimum baseline upon which to base their
decisions.
As with Chapple, the Moon test has been applied to exclude, admit,
and limit. In State v. Johnson, the court affirmed a trial court ruling to
limit expert testimony in a case where four witnesses had identified the
defendant.'52 Despite the lack of physical evidence, the court held that
the facts were sufficiently distinguishable from Moon to justify the
lower court's decision. 53 Conversely, in State v. Taylor, the court
reversed the exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Geoffrey Loftus."' The
Moon requirements were well met where the identification of the defen-
dant was the principal issue, he had presented an alibi defense, and there
was little additional evidence linking the defendant to the crime. The
court held that the testimony regarding stress and weapons focus should
be admitted. 5 5 It is important to note that if a case does not meet all of
the Moon factors, the testimony is not per se inadmissible. The issue
then becomes one for the trial court's discretion and is reviewed under
that standard. 1
56
The South Carolina court adopted a hybrid test in State v. Wha-
ley. 157 In Whaley, the African-American defendant in an armed robbery
case was identified by two white witnesses who had only seen an
obscured portion of his face. The defense offered an expert witness to
150. Id. at 1267-68.
151. Id. at 1268.
152. 743 P.2d 290 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
153. Id. at 294.
154. 749 P.2d 181 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
155. Id. at 184-85.
156. Id.; see also State v. Di Bartolo, No. 17261-9-Ili, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1195 (Wash.
Ct. App. July 13, 2000) (holding no abuse of discretion in a case that did not meet the Moon
threshold).
157. 406 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1991).
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testify to various factors, including the heightened opportunity for error
in cross-racial identifications.' 58 The trial court excluded the evidence
on the somewhat questionable basis that courts were just not ready for
that type of evidence. 159 Interestingly, the Supreme Court of South Car-
olina carefully pulled this evidence out of the realm of scientific evi-
dence and into the realm of expert opinion evidence, despite ruling that
this type of evidence would meet the threshold requirements for admissi-
ble scientific evidence. 160 The court noted two instances where the evi-
dence would be per se admissible: (1) where the witness has a mental or
physical impairment; and (2) where the main issue of eyewitness identi-
fication is the sole evidence against the defendant and stands uncorrobo-
rated. The court, however, was careful to limit admissibility to general
testimony not regarding a particular witness. 16' As with Moon, the
courts have articulated a test wherein the guiltier the defendant appears,
the less likely that the expert testimony will be admitted. Yet there is
once again a minimum threshold for admissibility that may serve to pre-
vent erroneous identifications in the close case.
South Carolina, as well as the vast majority of other jurisdictions,
require that the testimony be extremely generalized in nature. Testi-
mony relating to a particularized eyewitness identification would be sub-
ject to per se exclusion. Conversely, the courts of Texas have always
insisted on some level of specificity, premised on a notion of "fit." A
definite and firm correlation between the proffered testimony and the
facts of the case at bar was required. This notion of "fit" was construed
fairly strictly1 62 until Jordan v. State.163 In Jordan, there were a number
of cross-racial, delayed, and/or ambiguous identifications of a suspect in
a convenience store robbery. The defendant claimed alibi and mis-iden-
tification, and a co-defendant claimed that the defendant was not
involved in the crime. The defense offered an expert to testify to a vari-
ety of factors casting doubt on the identifications. The trial court
excluded his testimony as not beyond the common knowledge of the
jury.' 6' The appeals court affirmed, but based on lack of fit, the Texas
standby. 65 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held this an error.
158. Id. at 371.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 371-72.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, No. 05-93-01878-CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2630 (Tex. Ct.
App. Oct. 25, 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion where the testimony did not precisely fit the
facts); Merritt v. State, No. 01-93-01009-CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2359 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept.
28, 1995) (same).
163. 928 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
164. Id. at 553.
165. Id.
1081
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
While fit was necessary, it was not necessary for the testimony to
include every possible pertinent fact requiring such would go beyond
Texas Rule of Evidence 702.166 So long as the proffered testimony is
sufficiently tailored to the facts, it should be admissible on that basis.' 6 7
Two other cases are informative in understanding the formalistic
view that Texas applies to this area of the law. In Weatherred v. State,
the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a lower court ruling admitting
expert testimony excluded by the trial court.' 68 While the trial court
gave no reason for its exclusion, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld
the exclusion simply because the trial court could have excluded on the
basis of the witness's failure to name any studies, researchers, or writ-
ings that he relied on in his offer of proof.'69 The court claimed that the
defendant bore the responsibility of convincing the court that it was not
merely "junk science,"' 7 ° a curious assertion in light of the numerous
times that this very type of testimony had come before the court.
Wright-Thomas v. State shows a return to the strict interpretation of
fit. 17 ' The Court upheld the exclusion of expert testimony where the
"proffered testimony did not tie the specific facts of [the] case to the
scientific principles at issue and was not shown to be relevant to the
issues in the case."'' 7 2 Little pattern can be seen in the Texas decisions
beyond a somewhat perverse constructionist bent that has created a
unique body of jurisprudence thankfully limited to Texas.
Perhaps one of the finest expressions of the true discretionary rule
may be seen in Johnson v. State, a Georgia Supreme Court case. 173 The
old rule in Georgia had been that of Norris v. State, which had been
interpreted as a per se exclusionary rule.' 74 The court in Johnson clearly
repudiated that doctrine, and further asserted that it would not join the
limited admissibility jurisdictions either.' 75 The rule articulated by the
Johnson court should become the watchwords of the true discretionary
state:
Where eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of
166. Texas has the same rule as FED. R. EvID. 702.
167. Jordan, 928 S.W.2d at 556. The court also briefly considered the scientific reliability of
the evidence, but this was not the main thrust of the case. On remand, the court of appeals held
the evidence scientifically valid, or at lest not an abuse of discretion to be admitted. See State v.
Jordan, 950 S.W.2d 210, 212 (1997).
168. 15 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
169. Id. at 543.
170. Id. at 542.
171. No. S-98-01623-CR, S-98-01624-CR, S-98-01625-CR, S-98-01626-CR, 2000 Tex. App.
LEXIS 5610 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 22, 2000).
172. Id. at 15-16.
173. 526 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. 2000).
174. See 376 S.E.2d 653 (Ga. 1989).
175. Jordan, 526 S.E.2d at 552-53.
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the State's case and there is no substantial corroboration of that iden-
tification by other evidence, trial courts may not exclude expert testi-
mony without carefully weighing whether the evidence would assist
the jury in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony and
whether expert eyewitness testimony is the only effective way to
reveal any weakness in an eyewitness identification. However, the
admission or exclusion of this evidence "lies within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court .... 76
Once again, the courts have bestowed discretion upon the trial judge
while providing a minimal standard where the testimony should be more
carefully scrutinized.
Florida has likewise made a strong commitment to the discretionary
rule in its purest form. In the well-written McMullen v. State, the court
discusses the three groups that we have delineated here, although per-
haps naively characterizing far more jurisdictions as truly discretionary
than have been placed in that category in this Comment. 177 Nonetheless,
despite claiming to accept the discretionary rule, McMullen might have
easily been reversed in many other jurisdictions. There were cross-
racial identifications, inconsistent statements, little additional evidence,
and the presence of a defense alibi. The facts here bear a resemblance to
McDonald and it certainly would not have been an abuse of discretion to
admit the testimony. Yet, the court simply sat back and allowed the trial
judge to make the decision without any real review. While the standard
was correctly delineated, it is questionable whether any exclusion would
be overturned in Florida at the time of McMullen. Discretion in this case
is merely code for no judicial review.
There are numerous examples of more probing uses of judicial
review than seen in McMullen. In State v. Miles, the Minnesota court
reviewed the exclusion of testimony in a murder trial where three wit-
nesses identified the defendant.' 78 While the identifications were cross-
racial, a possible confession and physical evidence were also available.
The defendant produced an alibi, that the prosecution effectively
impeached. The court found that there was plenty of adequate evidence
beyond the eyewitnesses. Moreover, cross-examination, argument and
adequate closing instructions were all available at trial. 179 Therefore, the
testimony of the expert was not admitted. 80 This result was consistent
with a long-standing Minnesota policy of searching for the presence of
176. Id. at 552 (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting O'Neal v State, 325 S.E.2d 759, 761
(Ga. 1985)).
177. 714 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1998).
178. 585 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1998).
179. Id. at 372-73.
180. Id.
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safeguards in order to evaluate the totality of the circumstances.' 8'
Again, a court balanced the probability of guilt versus innocence in
determining whether necessity overcame the dangers of allowing the tes-
timony. While this is not a legal test, it would appear to be both fair and
effective.
Likewise, the Wyoming courts have tried to accommodate the lib-
eral admissions policy of the Federal Rules of Evidence and follow the
modem trend to allow, subject to discretion, expert testimony in this
area.' 82 The Ohio Court has also tried to provide guidance to the lower
courts by holding that, while in the standard case expert testimony
would not be admissible, there may be special circumstances where spe-
cific identifiable needs make the testimony helpful and therefore admis-
sible. 83  Ohio has followed a strict abuse standard by excluding
testimony where there was a daylight observation by disinterested
observers, 84 while allowing testimony where the only evidence was a
questionable eyewitness identification.' 85 Finally, Connecticut provided
a useful discretionary standard in State v. Kemp.'86 The Kemp standard
provided the familiar federal rules based query for allowing expert testi-
mony if one possessing particularized skill or knowledge not common to
the average juror can offer helpful testimony.' 87 But, this testimony is
disfavored, as due process, cross-examination, jury instructions, and
closing argument are adequate safeguards. 8 8 This general disfavoring
has been reiterated recently by the Connecticut Supreme Court, 89 but at
least the lower courts have received some guidance, and one can hope
that Connecticut is not another "rubber-stamp" state.
C. "YES! (Sometimes) "-The Limited Admissibility Rule
This is perhaps the easiest of the rules to discuss since its propo-
nents are so few. California and Massachusetts, alone among the states,
have adopted a rule where the exclusion of expert eyewitness testimony
181. See generally State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1980).
182. See, e.g., Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991) (holding that the modem trend of
favoring admissibility is to be incorporated into the traditional discretionary rule) (The Wyoming
rules of evidence roughly parallel the Federal Rules of Evidence).
183. See, e.g., State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1986).
184. See State v. Martin, No. C-980444, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4067 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 3,
1999).
185. See State v. Sinkfield, No. 17690, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1913 (Ohio Ct. App. May 5,
2000).
186. 507 A.2d 1387 (Conn. 1986).
187. Id. at 1389.
188. Id. at 1390.
189. See State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107 (Conn. 1999), which holds that no abuse of
discretion exists where there is a questionable identification but other evidence is available and
that expert eyewitness testimony is still disfavored.
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is a per se abuse of discretion in certain limited circumstances. The
seminal state case on this standard is the 1984 California case of People
v. McDonald.'90
In McDonald, a jury convicted an African-American defendant of
first-degree murder with a special circumstance of robbery that resulted
in the death penalty. The key issue in the case was the identity of the
perpetrator. Seven eyewitnesses testified for the prosecution that the
defendant was indeed the perpetrator, albeit with varying degrees of cer-
tainty. The defense countered with a large number of alibi witnesses.
Four of the prosecution witnesses positively identified the defendant in
court, but there were potential problems with the testimony of all
four. 191
Witness A's view was partially blocked, the murderer had his back
to her, and she was terrified. Moreover, she could not positively identify
the defendant during two photo lineups. Witness B, a passenger in Wit-
ness A's car, told a similar tale and admitted under cross-examination
that he had been unable to positively identify the defendant in the photo
lineups, in fact, selecting two photos. Witness C saw the crime from
outside of his car and identified the defendant in court but, on cross by
defense counsel, admitted that he had not identified him previously as
well as other inconsistencies in his story. Witness D also had an
obstructed view of the incident and was justifiably frightened. She did
manage a quick sideways glance at the perpetrator as he walked by her
but was unable to positively identify more than a similarity between the
gunman and the defendant prior to trial.' 92 None of the other witnesses
were able to give a firm identification.' 93
The defense sought to introduce the expert testimony of Dr. Robert
Shomer. At an evidentiary hearing, Shomer indicated he would testify
regarding factors affecting reliability as well as to counter common mis-
conceptions about identifications.' 94 Shomer did not intend to testify
about the particular reliability of any witness. 95 The trial court
excluded his testimony, relying on the controlling California case at the
time, People v. Johnson.9 6 Johnson held that in the absence of any
psychological or physical defects of a witness, expert testimony would
190. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1985) (adopting this rule).
191. Id. at 711-16.
192. Id. at 712.
193. Id. at 711-14.
194. Id. at 715.
195. Id. at 716.
196. 112 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
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be an invasion of the province of the jury. 197 The trial court in McDon-
ald expanded on Johnson by commenting that introduction of the expert
testimony would possibly cause juror confusion and was not scientific
enough anyway.' 98 This poor analytical reasoning led to a reversal at
the appellate level.
The California Supreme Court overruled Johnson. The court stated
that Johnson had applied the wrong sections of the evidence code, at
least as applied to the case at bar. '99 The first section quoted in Johnson,
section 801, California Evidence Code, applied to testimony in the form
of an opinion.20 0 The court reasoned that Dr. Shomer would be testify-
ing to facts, "the contents of eyewitness identification studies reported in
the professional literature."20 ' His testimony would not bear on the reli-
ability of any particular witness or identification. A qualified expert is
clearly permitted to testify in this manner in light of section 351, Cali-
fornia Evidence Code, (relevance) and section 720, California Evidence
Code, (expert testimony by a qualified expert).202 The other section
quoted in Johnson,203 section 780, California Evidence Code was inter-
preted by the Johnson court as not allowing a witness to testify as to the
capacity to perceive, recollect, or communicate of another witness.20 4
The McDonald court reasoned that Dr. Shomer would not have been
testifying about the capacity of any particular witness, but merely pro-
viding general information. 2 5 Thus, the court held that expert testimony
may be admitted when it would be of assistance to the jury, and should
only be excluded "when it would add nothing at all to the jury's com-
mon fund of information ... 206 The exclusion of this particular testi-
mony undercut the defendant's main argument, and jurors were deprived
"of information that could have assisted them in resolving that crucial
issue. ' 207 The Johnson court effectively took the "fit" argument so fre-
quently used in discretionary jurisdictions and came up with a test
wherein "fit" would always be satisfied.
The court articulated the rule that is emblematic of the "limited
admissibility" jurisdictions:
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element
197. Id. at 837.
198. McDonald, 690 P.2d at 716-17.
199. Id. at 719.
200. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1984).
201. McDonald, 690 P.2d at 719.
202. CAL. EVID. CODE § 351 and § 720 (West 1984).
203. CAL. EVID. CODE § 780 (West 1984).
204. 112 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
205. McDonald, 690 P.2d at 719.
206. Id. at 720.
207. Id. at 726.
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of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evi-
dence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers quali-
fied expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the
record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but
are not likely to be fully known or understood by the jury, it will
ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony.
20 8
While creating a per se rule of admissibility (at least in the speci-
fied circumstances), the court somewhat disingenuously stated that it did
not intend to displace the discretion that should be accorded to the trial
judge.2 °9 Yet, it did not intend to abdicate what it perceived as a duty to
apply a non-discretionary standard.210 This curious half-measure deci-
sion has not been extensively followed, at least in an explicit sense,
however, it has had some implications. 2t
Several states, while ostensibly following the "majority" rule, have
in fact migrated to a McDonald-like posture. Massachusetts had long
held that, although expert testimony on the capacity of eyewitness testi-
mony is not per se admissible of right, it is admissible as a matter of
discretion. 2 2 The court held in Commonwealth v. Francis that expert
testimony was not a good safeguard of misidentification, particularly
considering its tendency to cause misidentification.21 3 Since the testi-
mony that was offered in this case 2 14 was not beyond the ordinary expe-
rience of jurors, the court should instead have offered an instruction as a
safeguard.215 Yet, in Commonwealth v. Santoli, the court acknowledged
that the discretionary rule might result in disparate treatment of similarly
situated cases.2 16 While declining to formally adopt a limited admissi-
bility rule, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court offered "gui-
dance" to assist judges in their exercise of discretion.21 7 The court
treated McDonald and its progeny with favor and remarked on the fact
specific circumstances that might conceivably call abuse of discretion
208. id. at 727.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., People v. Fudge, 875 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1994) (allowing expert eyewitness
identification, but not incorporating a detailed instruction regarding the vagaries of eyewitness
identification). But see People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1995) (excluding expert testimony
where identification was a key point of the case, where both the witnesses and the identification
were strong and unequivocal).
212. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (Mass. 1983).
213. Id. at 1210.
214. Testimony was offered by Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, the leading expert in the field,
acknowledged by the court as a qualified expert. Id. at 1206.
215. Id. at 1210; see also Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168 (Mass. 1995) (reaffirming
Francis).
216. 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Mass. 1997).
217. Id. at 1116-17.
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into play.21 8 Generally, the court acknowledged that these cases
involved circumstances where there was little or no corroborating evi-
dence.2 9 The court declined to admit the testimony offered in the case
because there was corroborative physical evidence present.22° Yet, the
implication of the case was clear. Lower courts would be well served to
follow the limited inclusionary rule or risk being reversed. The court
also hinted that the use of instructions might be a substitute for expert
testimony, particularly as the scientific principles involved became more
grounded.22'
Further confirmation of the Massachusetts position came in Com-
monwealth v. Ashley.22 In Ashley, the defendant was charged with a
shooting. Three witnesses, two of whom were policemen, identified the
defendant in a lineup. Two of the witnesses identified the defendant to a
100% certainty. Other evidence included an identification of the defen-
dant's car at the scene of the crime and testimony as to motive. There-
fore, this fell outside the limited admissibility rule. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court court was careful to mention the Santoli ruling
and affirm that even though the trial judge did not have the benefit of the
guidance of the court, he had come to the correct decision anyway.2 3
The trial judge had held that this was a "simple garden variety identifica-
tion-type case and it [did] not require any expertise relative to the capac-
ity of a witness to make an identification. 224
The Supreme Judicial Court had implicitly reiterated its inclusion-
ary rule under the right circumstances. In fact, the amount of discretion
actually left to the lower courts was intact unless the particular circum-
stances came up, but, as in McDonald, the spectrum of cases that would
fit within the exception could conceivably swallow the rule.225 While
other courts have adopted a "liberal" discretionary view, weighted
toward admissibility, some even hinting at moving toward the limited
admissibility rule, no other state yet has explicitly moved in this
direction.
218. Id. at 1115.
219. id. at 1119-20.
220. Id. at 1121.
221. Id.
222. 694 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 1998).
223. Id. at 866.
224. Id.
225. Many commentators would speculate that State v. Chapple, 660 P. 2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983),
would fall into this category. A close reading, however, reveals that Chapple is limited to a far
narrower set of circumstances than are present in the limited admissibility cases.
226. Colorado has moved solidly towards this result, but stopped short of joining this camp.
See, e.g., Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d I (Colo. 1991) (stating that Downing provides room for
admissibility, but the court explicitly declined to adopt a per se rule in favor of allowing this
testimony).
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V. FEDERAL DECISIONS
A. NEVER (Well Hardly Ever)-Per Se Exclusion and Discretion
Federal courts have frequently been called upon to determine
admissibility in this area. Generally the federal judiciary has not favored
admissibility. Most jurisdictions adhere to at least a facial allegiance to
the discretionary rule. However, the federal courts have virtually uni-
formly rejected expert testimony on eyewitnesses misidentification.
This may well be due in large part to the nature of the cases arising in
the federal courts. Rarely do these cases involve a single eyewitness
without any further corroboration. Conversely, the state courts are rid-
dled with highly suspect cases often involving single eyewitnesses.
Therefore, even a federal court operating under the Moon test would be
ill-disposed toward admissibility, simply because few factual situations
in federal court would reach the minimum threshold. The high rate of
convictions in the federal courts, as compared to the significantly lower
conviction rates in the state courts, speaks to the difference in the type of
non-eyewitness evidence generally present in a federal case. These
cases are not purse-snatchings or low-level drug deals, but large quantity
drug transactions, kidnappings, or bank robberies where the federal
authorities often have significant corroborative evidence. The eyewit-
ness identification is often icing on the cake. Therefore, a likelihood of
guilt analysis seen in some states will seldom benefit the defendant.
Alone among federal jurisdictions, the Eleventh Circuit has explic-
itly rejected the admission of expert testimony. The court has taken to
doing this without comment. In United States v. Benitez, the court
affirmed the conviction of a drug dealer and the district court's exclu-
sion of expert testimony on the basis that such testimony was inadmissi-
ble in the circuit, scarcely a helpful rationale.227 United States v.
Holloway"' is similarly instructive. The court simply stated that the
argument was without merit, and there was no reason to reconsider the
precedent of the circuit that such testimony was inadmissible.229 Both
cases cited to United States v. Thevis,23° a pre-Daubert case. In Thevis,
the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the testimony of an expert citing the availability of cross-examination to
counter any problems with the identification.23" ' Thevis however, does
not necessarily indicate that the Eleventh Circuit had adopted a per se
exclusionary rule. Yet, in United States v. Smith, the court held that
227. Id.
228. 971 F.2d 675 (11 th Cir. 1992).
229. Id. at 679.
230. 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982).
231. Id. at 641.
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Thevis did indeed establish an exclusionary rule. 32 The court claimed
that there was no need to vitiate the Thevis ruling, or indeed even to re-
examine it, in light of Daubert.233 The court found cross-examination
and jury instructions sufficient to serve the purposes of expert
testimony. 34
Perhaps the single most important case on this issue was decided in
the Third Circuit. In United States v. Downing, the court fashioned a
balancing test that essentially became the heart and soul of the Daubert
test.2 35 After conducting a balancing test regarding the admissibility of
the evidence on a scientific basis, 2 36 the court devised a test of fit to
determine whether there was a specific connection between the prof-
fered testimony and the particular features of the eyewitness identifica-
tions involved. 37 In remanding the case for reconsideration the
appellate court envisioned a liberal tilt towards admissibility, but still
left the trial judge discretion to exclude expert testimony based on the
lack of fit or even under Rule 403.238 On remand, the district court
declined to admit the testimony, citing a lack of fit.
2 39
The Third Circuit has consistently applied this flexible standard. In
United States v. Dowling, the court affirmed convictions for bank rob-
bery, holding that there was no abuse of discretion where the testimony
of the expert lacked a proper fit to the specific facts of the case.24° Con-
versely, in United States v. Stevens, the trial judge had permitted testi-
mony on cross-racial identification, weapons focus, and stress but
disallowed other testimony regarding the correlation between confidence
and accuracy, as well as the use of a "wanted board. 2 41 The appellate
court affirmed the exclusion of the board but reversed on the accuracy
correlation, holding that there was fit as the correlation was
counterintuitive. 42
While the Third Circuit is a paradigm of a true discretionary juris-
diction, other federal jurisdictions have merely paid lip service to a dis-
cretionary standard. The overwhelming majority merely iterates a
discretionary standard while affirming a lower court decision to exclude
testimony. For example, in United States v. Brien, the court held that
232. 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
236. See Daubert discussion, infra Part III.A.
237. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239-41.
238. Id. at 1242-43.
239. 609 F. Supp. 784, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985).
240. 855 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1988), aff d, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
241. 935 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1991).
242. Id. at 1400-01.
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trial courts should take proffers individually and weigh them in light of
reliability and helpfulness, the importance of the testimony, and any
considerations of jury confusion or delay. 243 The First Circuit declined
to adopt a per se rule in either direction, explicitly adopting the discre-
tionary rule. 24 The court did so, however, while affirming the trial
judge's exclusion based on a lack of a sufficient proffer by the
defense.2"5 It should be noted that, at least at the district court level,
there are examples where expert identification testimony has been per-
mitted in this circuit.
246
Most other circuits join in this trend towards allowing the trial
judge wide discretion while generally disfavoring this type of testimony.
For example, in United States v. Harris, the Fourth Circuit noted a trend
to allow such testimony "under circumstances described as 'narrow.' "247
However, the court declined to find that the case of multiple eyewitness
identifications of an armed bank robber fell within this narrow exception
owing to the "eyewitness cornucopia" that was present and the lack of fit
between the facts and the proffered testimony.
248
The Seventh Circuit has likewise adopted an ostensible discretion-
ary rule while finding that expert testimony is generally within the ken
of the jurors. 249 In Gregory-Bey v. Hanks, the District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana went so far as to suggest that where there is
corroborative evidence, a defendant must affirmatively show that the
jury is not alerted in some way to the potential problems associated with
eyewitness identification. 5 0 The Gregory-Bey court goes on to use par-
ticularly strong language to state that admission of eyewitness expert
testimony is never constitutionally mandated.25' This case also suggests
that even the failure to give an instruction concerning the vagaries of
eyewitness identification does not constitute a due process violation.252
This case is representative of the extreme disfavor with which many
federal courts, particularly those of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits,
hold expert eyewitness testimony. Yet, true to its reputation as one of
the "maverick" circuits of the United States judiciary, the Seventh Cir-
243. 59 F.3d 274, 277 (1st Cir. 1995).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
247. 995 F.2d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 1993).
248. Id. at 535-36.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
unreliability of identifications made under stress was within the common knowledge of lay
jurors).
250. No. IP 94-903-C H/G, 2000 US Dist. LEXIS 18932, at *65-66 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 29, 2000).
251. Id. at *66.
252. Id. at *66 n.18.
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cuit has come up with some interesting solutions outside of the main-
stream that will be discussed infra. 3
In sum, it seems safe to say that the majority rule is akin to the
"catch-all" hearsay exception. Many of the discretionary jurisdictions
are merely exclusionary or limited admissibility states hiding behind a
veneer of judicial conservatism. Others seem to have either no standards
or unusual ones rendering them outside of the mainstream. Only a small
minority appears to have developed coherent rules, and these vary so
greatly in both their composition and execution from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction that the majority rule could be sub-divided into many minor-
ity rules subsumed within a rhetorical umbrella.254
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO ADMISSIBILITY
As can be seen from the analysis supra, courts have developed a
number of alternatives to ameliorate the potential problems of erroneous
identifications. These range from a reliance on existing procedures to
specialized jury instructions to other more imaginative solutions. A
brief discussion of some of these solutions follows. A potential applica-
tion of these solutions to the hypothetical presented at the opening of the
paper is also included.
A. Jury Instructions
Many of the jurisdictions discussed supra have required jury
instructions to further guard against any jury misconceptions. In United
States v. Rincon, the Ninth Circuit provides an excellent example of a
model instruction that could apply to the hypothetical. 5 Holding that
the use of jury instructions was adequate to exclude the testimony of an
expert witness, the court cited with approval the instructions given by
the district judge. The judge instructed the jury to consider:
1) the capacity and adequate opportunity of the witness to observe
the offender based upon the duration and conditions of the
observation;
2) whether the identification was the product of the eyewitnesses'
own memory or prompted by subsequent suggestiveness;
3) whether the eyewitness has made inconsistent identifications;
4) whether the testimony was credible;
253. See United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1118 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
254. Of course there are numerous jurisdictions that were not mentioned in the course of this
survey. Some have little or no case law. Others fell into one of the groups already described under
the majority rule. Still others, had such nebulous standards that they were incapable of
classification.
255. 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
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5) the nature of the lineup; and
6) the length of time between the occurrence of the crime and the
eyewitness identification.256
While this instruction did not include a reference to cross-racial identifi-
cation, courts have held that the judge has discretion to give such an
instruction. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that "[a
jury] may consider the fact of any such cross-racial identification and
whether the identification by a person of different race from the defen-
dant may be less reliable than identifications by a person of the same
race."
257
Most states have a standard identification instruction. For example,
in Wisconsin, the standard instruction reads in pertinent part:
[T]he identification of the defendant is an issue in this case. If you
find that the crime alleged, that is, in each particular instance, was
committed, before you may find the defendant guilty you must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the person
who committed the crime, and, of course, you've got to make a find-
ing independently in [each] charge.2 58
The Telfaire instruction, derived from United States v. Telfaire,259
speaks specifically to questionable eyewitness identifications. The
instruction begins as follows:
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of
the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Government has
the burden of providing [sic] identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It
is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the
correctness of his statement. However, you, the jury, must be satis-
fied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification
of the defendant before you may convict him . . . .Identification
testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the witness. Its
value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the
offender at the time of the offense and to make a reasonable identifi-
cation later.2 6°
The instruction goes on to state several factors for consideration
such as: (1) whether the witness had both the capacity and an adequate
opportunity for observation; (2) the strength and circumstances of the
recollection, specifically including the length of time between incident
and identification; (3) occasions where the witness failed to identify or
256. Id. at 925-26.
257. Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Mass. 1995).
258. State v. Small, No. 83-2439-CR, 1984 Wis. App. LEXIS 3971 (Wisc. Ct. App. Jul. 24,
1984).
259. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
260. Id. at 558.
1093
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
misidentified the defendant; and (4) the credibility of the witness in gen-
eral. 26" ' In effect, the court is able to provide much of the information
available via expert testimony in an instructional manner without giving
it the cachet of authority that expert testimony may impose even upon
the most carefully phrased generalities.
In State v. Small, the Wisconsin court chose to give a special
instruction in light of the admitted testimony of Dr. Stephen Penrod.262
The jury was instructed that:
A witness may inform the jury of psychological principles underlying
human observation and perception, but the jury must retain the task
of and the responsibility for applying these principles to the specific
facts in the cases under consideration. The jury must not abdicate or
surrender its duty which is to determine the credibility of various wit-
nesses and the weight to be given to the testimony of each, nor must a
jury surrender their own common sense in weighing testimony.2 63
This instruction seems tailored to ameliorate the possible prejudicial
effects of the expert testimony and moderates the "expert as God" effect
that seems to scare so many courts and observers.
If the hypothetical is in a jurisdiction that encourages the utilization
of cautionary jury instructions, then these would seem to cover the facts
of the case. Taken as a whole, along with the cross-examination and the
closing argument, this seems to even further safeguard both the integrity
of the judicial process and the rights of the defendant.
B. Cross-Examination
As seen supra, numerous courts have held that the appropriate
forum to challenge an eyewitness identification is in cross-examination,
generally in conjunction with closing argument and often along with
jury instructions discussed infra. Cross-examination itself has long been
regarded, and rightly so, as "the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth." 2" There are identifiable weaknesses in this
approach. First, the typical eyewitness is sincerely convinced of her
own sincerity.2 65 This is one reason why expert testimony is frequently
proffered: to ameliorate the impossibility of shaking the unassailable
confidence of a witness who believes in herself. In fact, Dr. Loftus
posits that traditional cross-examination may reinforce the jury's faith in
261. Id. at 558-59.
262. Small, 1984 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3971 at *14.
263. Id. at *6 n.1l.
264. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1367, at
29 (3d ed. 1940)).
265. Lonrus, supra note 12, § 10-1.
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Moreover, eyewitnesses are frequently the victims of crime and
therefore subject to the sympathies of the jury. Even where the witness
is a bystander, the jury is generally more likely to sympathize with her
than with a hard-pressing lawyer using all the tricks in his repertoire to
damage the eyewitness's credibility. 67 Particular types of identification
problems, such as the potential for error in cross-racial identifications,
are a veritable minefield for the cross-examiner. Here, he runs the risk
of converting even a bystander eyewitness into a victim.
How would a cross-examiner respond to these difficulties under the
facts of the hypothetical? In examining the clerk, there would be several
ways of handling the stress and weapons focus issues. The attorney
could simply ask her if she was under stress at the time of the incident, if
the assailant was carrying a weapon, and if she got a good look at him.
While this would satisfy the basic needs of the examination, the follow-
ing might be more effective:
Q: You were alone in the store. Right?
A: Yes.
Q: And this young man terrified you, right?
A: Yes.
Q: He was shouting?
A: Yes.
Q: And threatening you, correct?
A: Yes, he threatened to kill me!
Q: You believed him, didn't you?
A: Absolutely.
Q: There was no one there to help you?
A: No, I was alone and terrified.
Q: And he was pointing a gun at you, right?
A: Yes.
Q: You saw the gun, right?
A: Yes, I couldn't take my eyes off it. 6 8
While perhaps the last comment is a defense lawyer's dream, the
remainder of the questioning is extremely plausible and brings out the
stress and terror that the victim was under without attacking her. Com-
bined with a closing argument, which will be discussed infra, this may
be effective.
The uncertainty of the initial identification can likewise be brought
out on cross without bullying or sarcasm. Simply elucidating testimony
in a sympathetic manner that the witness was unable to initially identify
266. Id. § 10-1 (a).
267. Id. § 10-1(b).
268. The examination is modeled after that presented by Dr. Loftus. Id. § 10-6.
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the suspect lays the foundation. Moreover, the fact that a month tran-
spired can be gently probed as well. The cross-racial element, however,
simply cannot avoid an inquiry to the effect to, "they all look alike,
right?" without some sort of outside information. In certain circum-
stances, it may be possible to establish that a witness cannot distinguish
between a Malaysian and a Korean, however the risk to the attorney is
that of appearing a bully.
The other witnesses in the hypothetical are easier to effectively
cross-examine. Both the policeman and the customer only had a brief
encounter with the suspect, and this can easily be brought out on cross.
Likewise, the lighting conditions can be explored as well. Unfortunately
for the defense attorney, if the jury is unaware of the forgetting curve,
the effects of stress, and the weapons-focus problem, then all this work
may be for naught, notwithstanding the total inability to get at the
problems of cross-racial identification. For even the most skilled law-
yer, cross-examination by itself is probably insufficient to attack the
problems of eyewitness identification.
C. Closing Argument
The link between cross-examination and closing argument cannot
be overstated. Dr. Loftus has stated that "the cardinal flaw of inexperi-
enced cross-examiners is their failure to recognize that because closing
argument is argument, and because it is possible to ask jurors to draw
inferences during it, many dangerous patches of cross-examination can
be avoided." '269 In the model cross-examination supra, the examiner
avoided asking the victim the overly conclusive follow-up: "So you
were so stressed out, and so busy looking at the gun, you couldn't really
identify the suspect, could you?" The response could likely be some-
thing totally devastating, such as, "Sure I could! I was staring at him the
whole time, and it was your client beyond a doubt!"27
The time to attempt to help the jury draw such inferences is closing
argument. For example, the defense attorney could tie up the cross of
the victim by saying:
"You heard the victim testify to how terrified she was. She was in
fear of her life. She was staring down the barrel of a gun, and she
was scared out of her mind, and who wouldn't be?! The last thing she
was thinking about was getting a good look at the suspect. There was
no way she could make a reliable identification of him. That's why
she couldn't identify my client at the photo lineup. That's why she
269. Id. § 10-7 (emphasis in original).
270. The hapless attorney who asked this question would be well advised to remember the
equally hapless Christopher Darden suggesting O.J. Simpson try on the bloody gloves!
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couldn't identify him until a month later, when her memory may have
started to get hazy, just like any of us, and after the police told her
they already had a the criminal in custody. The other witnesses just
glanced at someone in passing, in less than ideal circumstances, a
rainy night and a dimly lit hallway. How could they be expected to
remember him accurately?"
In this way, the attorney educates the jury at least to some degree
about a few of the factors that may affect identification, while tying in
some of the admittedly less-effective cross-examination. Many judges
would find this sufficient to safeguard the interests of the defendant.
Others, however, would find that still one more procedure could be
effectuated. But, one prominent jurist has come up with an intriguing,
albeit unique, alternative to expert testimony.
D. The "Easterbrook" Plan
United States v. Hall is a relatively typical case where the court
affirms the discretion of the trial judge to exclude expert testimony.27
The majority opinion, written by Judge Kanne, offers an interesting, if
not particularly original, discussion of the issue and focuses the relation-
ship between cross-examination, argument, and jury instructions as
being sufficient to justify a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony."'
It is the concurrence of Judge Easterbrook, however, that is of real inter-
est, for it provides an original alternative that does not appear to have
been discussed previously.
First, Easterbrook states that there are any number of "empirical
propositions that may be investigated, and sometimes refuted, through
scientific means." '273 If this is so, experts could be presented to teach the
jury how to see through lawyering tricks, the weak correlation between
lying and apparent discomfort on the witness stand, or various issues in
group (i.e. jury) dynamics. 274 The possibilities are virtually endless, and
would result in a trial about trial, diverting attention away from the
issues of guilt or innocence. 5 In fact, experts could testify about the
effect of experts themselves on an empirical basis, the ultimate in circu-
lar logic.2 76 Thus, Easterbrook argues against utilizing this kind of
social science evidence at the trial level. Instead, he would have judges
"employ social science to improve the trial process. '"277
271. 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999).
272. Id. at 1107.
273. Id. at 1119.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1120.
277. Id. at 1119.
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Judges informed in various areas of social science could utilize this
knowledge to draft better instructions or, with the aid of linguistics
experts, interpret a statute. But Easterbrook would take this process a
giant step further. In his perfect scenario, judges would acquire special-
ized scientific knowledge and then pass that knowledge directly to the
jury. For example, the judge could "inform jurors of the rapid decrease
of accurate recollection, and the problem of suggestibility, without
encountering the delay and pitfalls of expert testimony. ' Easterbrook
even suggests that jurors would more likely accept that information from
a judge than a scholar, who, at least in Easterbrook's view, would be a
fidgety, unpersuasive witness in most cases.2 7 9 Apparently, the risks of
under-informed judges handing out half-baked and scurrilous scientific
theories is of little concern, for they could learn what they need through
"continuing judicial education programs and read[ing] the scholarly
literature .... 28
This rather astounding theory is difficult to apply to the hypotheti-
cal. One could only hope that the judge would have performed well in
his undergraduate science classes and done more research than a cursory
glance at "Nova" on PBS or a skim through the pages of Psychology
Today. Easterbrook's plan is intriguing, but seems to show an elitist
disdain for the abilities of scholars to educate a lay jury. A judge has
discretion to exclude testimony and provide jury instructions, but Easter-
brook's "Judge as Expert" theory smacks of judicial activism and should
be viewed with skepticism.
E. Limiting Testimony
Another option for the court is to limit the testimony allowed in
court. Under the Rule 702 inquiry, the court would be justified in limit-
ing testimony to that which would be helpful to the jury. A number of
the discretionary rule cases cited supra have utilized this technique. The
fit requirement would allow the judge to specifically tailor the testimony
to best assist the jury in its deliberations. This is in line with Justice
Breyer's Kumho search for reliability and accuracy, that is correctness,
in determining admissibility. In the hypothetical, testimony could be
limited in virtually any manner at the discretion of the judge, hopefully
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VII. CONCLUSION
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions frown upon admission
of this type of expert testimony and with good reason. There is little
reason to turn a criminal trial into a battle of the experts with other, more
traditional safeguards already existing within the system.28" ' Cross-
examination and argument, in conjunction with well-crafted jury instruc-
tions along the lines of Rincon282 should be sufficient in most
circumstances.
There are circumstances, however, where this testimony should be
admitted. In cases where there is little or no other corroborative evi-
dence, this testimony is critical toward a fair adjudication on the merits.
Yet, in most cases, admitting this testimony poses the likelihood of cre-
ating reasonable doubt simply by having an expert testify to general fac-
tors that may very well not be applicable in any given instance. The fact
that some eyewitnesses may not reflect a correlation between confidence
and accuracy should not give an expert a broadsword with which to
destroy the credibility of all such witnesses. This testimony lacks the
crucial element of fit, even post-Kumho. The witness would fail the
Rule 702 requirement of applying the "principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.283 Nonetheless, while the courts should retain a
certain amount of discretion, it is important that guidelines be in place so
that, when certain threshold conditions are satisfied, this testimony will
be admitted.
The Moon test, discussed in detail supra, provides the clearest
exposition of the factors that a court should consider. Moon provides for
admissibility where identity is the principal issue, an alibi is presented,
and there is little or no corroborative evidence. Although Moon is a
non-exclusive framework, the presence of minimum standards provides
a level of protection in close cases while leaving the trial judge the
authority to avoid turning trials into Judge Easterbrook's worst
nightmare; 284 a terminal battle of dueling experts hopelessly confusing
the jurors and leading to results incompatible with the weight of the
evidence.
Critics would argue that trial judges are given too much discretion
and, in fact, are given carte blanche to reach their own conclusions as to
guilt or innocence before allowing this testimony to be admitted. A
281. Some might argue that trials have already degenerated into this type of battle. Thus, I
would argue that it is incumbent upon the courts to limit this and attempt to reverse this trend, lest
Judge Easterbrook's fears of experts testifying on the trial process itself become a reality.
282. 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
283. FED. R. EvID. 702.
284. The author shares Judge Easterbrook's sentiments in this regard.
1099
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
more cogent way of looking at the discretion vested in the trial judge is
to consider that, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there is no com-
pulsion to allow this testimony to be admitted. By determining whether
the circumstances are such as to provide a "close call" where, under the
Moon test or some other standard, testimony is admissible, the courts are
engaging in the type of ad hoc balancing explicitly allowed under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 403. The court is considering not only the Rule
403 prejudice versus probative value analysis but whether the interests
of judicial efficiency are being served. Prosecutors would have every
right to call contrary experts to refute the defense expert, and, once
again, Easterbrook's model of experts testifying on juror deliberations
does not seem far off.
As seen in the alternatives presented supra, there are any number of
safeguards already built into the system protecting the rights of the
defendant and allowing her to challenge the veracity or clarity of identi-
fications. Moreover, many judges are willing to give a fairly detailed
instruction regarding eyewitness identifications, and the Telfaire instruc-
tion or a variant thereof is commonly given in numerous jurisdictions. It
is critical to the integrity of the system that judges be permitted to exer-
cise their discretion in fashioning the proper instructions, and that attor-
neys utilize their skills to effectively cross-examine and argue. The
system is not served by allowing experts merely by dint of the undue
influence they exert as court-approved experts to cast generalized doubt
potentially skewing an impressionable jury toward finding reasonable
doubt where none exists. Only in the rare circumstances where either
the Moon factors are met or the judge believes that the interests of jus-
tice would be best served in a unique circumstance should this testimony
be admitted. Thankfully, the Kafkaesque nightmare of public defender
staff experts roaming the hallways of the courthouse in search of the
next opportunity to spew boilerplate does not appear likely to material-
ize. While per se exclusion is too harsh a rule, only the most limited of
circumstances call for admissibility.
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